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NOTE 
AFTER UNITED STATES v. VANEATON, 
DOES PAYTON v. NEW YORK PREVENT 
POLICE FROM MAKING WARRANTLESS 
ROUTINE ARRESTS INSIDE THE HOME? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Vaneaton/ the Ninth Circuit held that 
police did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution by making a warrantless arrest of a sus-
pect who answered his door in response to their knock.2 The 
majority distinguished the case from the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Payton v. New York,3 which ordinari-
ly requires police to obtain a warrant before arresting a sus-
pect inside his or her dwelling.4 Instead, the court found that 
the police did not need a warrant to arrest the suspect, even 
though he stood within the identifiable threshold of the door-
way, because he voluntarily exposed himself to the warrantless 
arrest by freely opening his door.5 In so holding, the Ninth 
Circuit ignored the firm line drawn in Payton by allowing a 
1. 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (per Trott, J., joined by Thompson J.) 
(Tashima J., District Judge for the C.D. of Cal., sitting by designation, dissenting), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996). 
2. Id. at 1427. 
3. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (drawing a bright line at the identifiable threshold of 
a dwelling and holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making 
a warrantless entry absent consent or exigent circumstances). See infra notes 53-
69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payton. 
4. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. The Payton rule also applies to motel rooms. 
E.g., United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1987) (The Payton 
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warrantless entry into a dwelling so long as police use no coer-
cion and announce the arrest before stepping inside.6 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1992, the Bend, Oregon police suspected John Vaneaton 
in several burglaries.7 In September, police went to Vaneaton's 
motel room intending to arrest him.8 Uniformed officers 
knocked on Vaneaton's door, but did not demand entry.9 
Vaneaton looked out of his window, saw the officers, and 
opened the door. 10 A detective asked if he was Jack 
Vaneaton. ll When Vaneaton answered affirmatively, police 
arrested him. 12 At that point, Vaneaton stood inside the 
threshold of the door while the officers stood outside.13 The 
arresting officer entered the room only after notifying 
Vaneaton that he was under arrest. 14 Mter handcuffing 
Vaneaton and advising him of his Miranda rights,15 the police 
asked for permission to search the room. 16 Vaneaton gave ver-
bal permission and signed a written consent form.17 When 
asked if he had a gun, Vaneaton directed the police to a closet 
where they found a revolver. 18 
6. See id. at 1429 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
7. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995). 
8. [d. at 1424-25. The parties did not dispute that the police had probable 
cause to arrest Vaneaton for receiving stolen property. [d. at 1424. Police were 
aware that Vaneaton had been selling jewelry stolen from the Bend area to Port-
land pawn shops. [d. On September 9, 1992, Bend police toured motels to deter-
mine whether Vaneaton had been in Bend when the jewelry was stolen. [d. at 
1425. Police not only discovered that Vaneaton had been in town at the time of 
the burglaries, but learned that he was staying at the Rainbow Motel that night. 
[d. 





14. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425. "At no time did Vaneaton ask the officers into 
his room, step back to allow them to enter, or indicate in any other way that he 
consented to their [initial] entry [to arrest]." [d. at 1428 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Police must clearly inform a 
person of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to 
a custodial interrogation.). 
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At trial, Vaneaton moved to suppress introduction of the 
revolver as evidence, claiming that the warrantless arrest 
violated the rule of Payton v. New York. 19 Absent consent or 
exigent circumstances, Payton requires police to obtain a war-
rant before entering a dwelling to make an arrest.20 The dis-
trict court denied Vaneaton's motion which allowed the prose-
cution to secure a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of felon 
in possession of a firearm.21 Vaneaton appealed the denial to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.22 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
applies to all searches and seizures by the government.23 The 
first clause protects individuals against unreasonable searches 
and seizures by government officials.24 The second clause re-
quires warrants to be specific and supported by probable 
cause.25 
The relationship between these two clauses has created a 
recurring controversy in Fourth Amendment interpretation.26 
19. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1424. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). See 
infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payton. 
20. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. 573). 
21. Id. at 1424. 
22. Id. 
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment also controls 
searches and seizures by state officials through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
25. Id. 
26. William W. Greenlaugh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the "Per Sen Rule: 
Justice Stewart's Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, 31 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1013-14 (1994). The Fourth Amendment does not explicit-
ly demand warrants for all searches or seizures, but if a warrant is issued, it 
must be specific and supported by probable cause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Since the framers did not focus their attention on precise lan-
guage, different interpretations have emerged.27 One interpre-
tation contends that the second clause should define the 
first.28 Under this view, a reasonable search or seizure re-
quires a warrant unless exceptional circumstances exist which 
make obtaining a warrant impractical. 29 
However, a majority of the Supreme Court reads the two 
clauses independently.3o It contends that the government 
need not obtain a warrant so long as the search or seizure is 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances of the case.31 The 
Court balances the individual's expectation of privacy against 
the governmental interest in investigating and preventing 
crime.32 Even under this interpretation, however, the Court 
demands that police obtain a warrant to enter a home absent 
consent or exigent circumstances.33 
27. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1989). The framers' immediate motivation was to protect indi-
viduals from indiscriminate searches conducted by the King's officers under the 
authority of "general warrants." [d. at 1392. Therefore, James Madison's proposed 
version to the first Congress contained only one clause directed to prevent the 
abuses arising from "general warrants." [d. at 1391. The original proposal to the 
first Congress provided that: 
The right to be secure in their persons, their houses, 
their papers, and their other property, from all unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated by war-
rants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be 
searched, or persons to be seized. 
[d. (emphasis added). However, before accepting the proposal, Congress amended 
the phrase "by warrants issued" to "and no warrants shall issue." [d. The state 
legislatures adopted and ratified this version of the Fourth Amendment with little 
discussion of its precise meaning. [d. 
28. Greenlaugh & Yost, supra note 26, at 1016. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. at 1014. 
31. [d. 
32. Thomas K Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After 
Hodari D. And Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1991). 
33. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); see infra notes 53-69 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Payton; see also United States v. Harris, 495 
U.S. 14 (1990) (applying Payton). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/10
1996] WARRANTLESS ARRESTS 139 
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S ARREST WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
In United States v. Watson,34 the Supreme Court held 
that a statute authorizing a warrantless arrest based on proba-
ble cause carried out in a public place did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.35 The strong presumption of constitution-
ality was not overcome in light of the statute's consistency 
with the Court's prior cases, the common law, and the prevail-
ing rule under state constitutions and statutes.36 However, 
the Court left open the question whether police needed a war-
rant to enter a suspect's dwelling to make an arrest.37 The 
Court answered this question affirmatively in Payton v. New 
York.3s 
In Payton, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the police from making a nonconsensual 
warrantless entry into a suspect's home to make an arrest ab-
sent exigent circumstances.39 However, four years earlier in 
United States v. Santana,40 the Supreme Court held that a 
suspect standing directly in her doorway as police approached 
stood in a public place.41 Considering these holdings, whether 
Payton prevents police from simply knocking on a suspect's 
door and then making an arrest when he opens it is not 
clear.42 
34. 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (Having probable cause to believe the defendant pos-
sessed stolen credit cards, postal officers made the arrest without a warrant in a 
public place.). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 415-19. 
37. Id. at 418 n.6. 
38. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
39. Id. at 576. 
40. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
41. Id. at 42. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Santana. 
42. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois 
v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and 
Exaggerates the Excuseability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. Rev. 1, 17 n.43 (1991). 
5
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1. United States v. Santana 
In United States v. Santana,43 the defendant stood direct-
ly in her doorway as police approached.44 When police identi-
fied themselves, the suspect retreated into the vestibule of her 
house.45 Without a warrant, the police pursued her into the 
house to effectuate the arrest.46 
The Supreme Court held that Santana was standing in a 
public place when police first sought to arrest her.47 The 
Court found that "she was not merely visible to the public but 
was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if 
she had been standing completely outside her house.,,48 There-
fore, the Court ruled that Santana had no expectation of priva-
cy while standing directly in her doorway.49 
The Santana Court also held that a suspect could not 
thwart an arrest set in motion in a public place by retreating 
into a private place. 50 The Court found that once Santana saw 
the police, there was a realistic expectation that any delay by 
police in completing the arrest would result in the destruction 
of evidence.51 Therefore, the entry was justified as involving 
"hot pursuit," an exigent circumstance which allows police to 
enter a dwelling without a warrant. 52 
43. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
44. [d. at 40. An officer testified that one step forward would have put her 
outside, while one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her resi-
dence. [d. at n.1. 
45. [d. at 40. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 42. 
48. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 43. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. See generally 2 JOHN W. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 22:27-30 at 
113-123 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing four justifications for a warrantless entry into 
the home: hot pursuit, possible destruction of evidence, likelihood of escape, and 
apprehension of peril). 
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2. Payton v. New York 
Two years later, in Payton v. New York53 and its compan-
ion case People v. Riddick,54 the Supreme Court drew a firm 
line at the entrance of the house.55 The Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless 
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make an 
arrest absent exigent circumstances. 56 
In Payton, officers forcibly entered the suspect's home after 
they received no response to their knock.57 Although Payton 
was not at home, officers seized evidence later used to convict 
him.58 In Riddick, the suspect's young son answered the door 
after the police knocked. 59 When the officers saw the suspect 
sitting in bed through the opened door, they entered and ar-
rested him.60 The Supreme Court held that both warrantless 
entries violated the Fourth Amendment.61 
The Court noted that "physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed."62 The majority held that courts should treat war-
rantless searches and seizures inside a home as presumptively 
unreasonable.63 The majority agreed that: 
To be arrested in the home involves not only the 
invasion attendant to all arrests but also an 
invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is 
simply too substantial an invasion to allow with-
out a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent 
circumstances, even when it is accomplished 
53. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
54. The Court consolidated Riddick with Payton and issued only one opinion. 
Id. For the purposes of this note, the rules and principles announced by the Court 
will be referred to as Payton. 
55. Id. at 590. 
56. Id. at 576. See generally HALL, supra note 52, at 113-123. 
57. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. 
58. Id. at 576-77. 
59. Id. at 578. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 603. 
62. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
63. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. 
7
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under statutory authority and when probable 
cause is clearly present.64 
The Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to draw a firm 
line at the entrance to the house, and held that, absent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant.65 
The Court then distinguished its reasoning in United 
States v. Watson,66 which upheld warrantless arrests in public 
places.67 The majority found the common law rule on warrant-
less arrests in the home less settled than that for warrantless 
public arrests.68 The majority noted that the prevailing prac-
tice when the Fourth Amendment was adopted required a 
warrant to make an arrest inside a home unless police were in 
hot pursuit.69 
3. Which Decision Controls When Police Summon the 
Arrestee's Presence at the Door by a Knock? 
Courts and commentators disagree whether Payton pre-
vents the police from simply knocking on a door and then ar-
resting a suspect when he answers it.70 Since Payton prohibits 
only a warrantless entry into a home, police should not need to 
obtain a warrant if the arrest can be accomplished without 
crossing the threshold.71 Payton does not prohibit suspects 
from surrendering to the police at their door.72 One commen-
tator argues that the legality of such arrests should not "be de-
termined by resort to a plumb bob."73 He suggests that a "de 
64. [d. at 588-89 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 
1978». 
65. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. 
66. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
67. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590-98. 
68. [d. at 596. 
69. [d. at 598. 
70. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(e) at 589 (2d ed. 
1987); HALL, supra note 52, at 127. 
71. LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 590. 
72. [d. 
73. See id. A "plumb bob" is a piece of lead or some other weight attached to 
a line used for determining perpendicularity. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UN-
ABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1107 (1989). 
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minimis" breaking of the vertical plane of the threshold by the 
arresting officer should not be a violation of the Payton rule.74 
However, another commentator argues that police should ob~ 
tain a warrant before knocking on a suspect's door because the 
police invariably need to enter to perfect an arrest. 75 
The Fifth Circuit relied on Santana to find that an individ-
ual had no protectable expectation of privacy after opening his 
hotel room door to police.76 The court held that the warrant-
less arrest of a suspect standing inside the threshold did not 
violate Payton because the arrest was effected before officers 
entered the room.77 
However, courts have held that a person does not neces-
sarily surrender his or her expectation of privacy merely by 
answering the door in response to a knock.7s If the police as-
sert their authority to arrest from outside a dwelling, the Sev-
enth Circuit allows them to cross the threshold to the extent 
necessary to complete the arrest only if the arrestee submits to 
that authority.79 Some courts have maintained that an arrest 
occurs in the home even if the arresting officer never crosses 
the threshold. so These courts consider the location of the ar-
74. See LAFAVE, supra note 70, at 590. 
75. See HALL, supra note 52, at 127. 
76. See United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987). 
77. [d. In Carrion, an agent aimed a gun at the suspect and ordered him to 
raise his hands. [d. The court found that the suspect must have understood that 
he was under arrest. [d. 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(people do not abandon their expectation of privacy by opening their door from 
within to answer a knock), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991); State v. Holeman 
693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985) (the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from arrest-
ing a suspect standing in the doorway of his house without a warrant absent 
exigent circumstances). 
79. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387. In Berkowitz, the government contended that 
the agent notified the suspect that he was under arrest from outside the threshold 
and that the defendant did not resist, but merely asked for his coat. [d. at 1380. 
The government's version of the facts would not have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. [d. at 1385. 
80. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984) (reject-
ing the argument that Payton is inapplicable since officers did not cross the 
threshold until the defendant was arrested at the door), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1061 (1985); State v. Holeman, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985) (rejecting the argu-
ment that Payton is inapplicable if police never physically cross the threshold 
because it is the location of the arrestee that determines whether an arrest occurs 
in the home). 
9
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restee, not the arresting officer, to determine whether an ar-
rest occurs inside the home.81 
4. Prior Ninth Circuit Decisions 
Before the Supreme Court decided Payton, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Botero82 held that police did not need 
a warrant to arrest a suspect as he opened his door in response 
to their knock.83 The unanimous court noted that the arrest-
ing officers had not entered the apartment.84 Therefore, the 
court stated that an issue of a warrantless entry was not be-
fore them.85 However, in dictum, the court noted that the ar-
resting officers could have entered the suspect's apartment 
because Santana held a doorway to be a public place.86 
After the Supreme Court decided Payton, the Ninth Circuit 
in United States v. Johnson87 considered the police conduct to 
determine whether a warrant was required to arrest a suspect 
who opened his door after police knocked.88 The Johnson court 
held that the warrantless arrest in the doorway violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the police used a subterfuge to get 
the defendant to open his door.89 The Ninth Circuit recognized 
that the defendant stood inside while the officers stood outside 
the home with their weapons drawn. The court found that "in 
these circumstances, it is the location of the arrested person, 
81. [d. Courts commonly cite United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 
757 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), for the proposition that it is the 
location of the arrestee that determines whether an arrest occurs inside the home. 
Broad reliance on Johnson may be unwarranted, however, because the court added 
the qualifier, "[i]n these circumstances," which included the fact that police had 
their weapons drawn. See id. at 757. 
82. 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978), cen. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). 




87. 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980). 
88. See id. at 757. 
89. [d. Police misrepresented their identities so "Johnson's initial exposure to 
the view and the physical control of the agents was not consensual on his part." 
[d. Other circuits agree with this reasoning. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 
F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984) (warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment 
when police obtained the defendant's presence at the door by flooding the house 
with spotlights and summoned him with a bullhorn). 
10
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not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest 
occurs in the home.,,9o 
In United States v. Whitten,91 the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
warrantless arrest of a suspect who stood in the doorway after 
opening his door.92 The Ninth Circuit relied on Santana for 
the proposition that a doorway, unlike the interior of a hotel 
room, is a public place.93 Therefore, the court concluded that 
the police did not need a warrant.94 However, before United 
States v. Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit had not decided a case in 
which the government conceded that the arrestee clearly stood 
"inside" the threshold after answering his door to police who 
had simply knocked.95 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY: EXPOSED TO ARREST BY VOLUNTARILY OPENING 
THE DOOR 
The majority in United States v. Vaneaton held that police 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution when they made a warrantless arrest of a suspect 
who answered his door in response to their knock.96 The ma-
jority noted that this case did not implicate the zone of privacy 
that the Supreme Court sought to protect in Payton v. New 
York. 97 The majority found that knocking on Vaneaton's door 
did not resemble the kind of "invasion" or "intrusion" that 
90. Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757. 
91. 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983). 
92. [d. at 1015. Contra United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 1984) ("To the extent that Whitten validates the warrantless arrest of individ-
uals standing in the doorway of a private residence absent exigent circumstances, 
we believe that this holding is contrary to the rule established in Payton. j. 
93. Whitten, 706 F.2d at 1015. 
94. [d. Although the warrantless arrest at the door was legal, the Whitten 
court found the subsequent entry into the suspect's room to have violated the 
Fourth Amendment since police had not obtained consent. [d. at 1016. 
95. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423. 
96. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995). 
97. [d. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Supreme 
Court stated that the "Fourth Amendment has drawn a finn line at the entrance 
to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be 
crossed without a warrant." [d. at 590. See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Payton. 
11
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Payton guards against.98 The majority distinguished Payton 
by noting that in that case the entries preceded the arrests, 
while police advised Vaneaton that he was under arrest while 
still outside the threshold. 99 
Although the majority recognized that police are prohibit-
ed from making a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's dwell-
ing to make a felony arrest absent exigent circumstances, the 
court refused to decide the case on whether Vaneaton was 
standing inside or outside the threshold of the doorway.lOo 
Instead, the majority focused on whether Vaneaton voluntarily 
exposed himself to the warrantless arrest by freely opening the 
door of his motel room to the police. 101 
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its earlier holding in 
United States v. Johnson 102 that the warrantless arrest of the 
defendant in his doorway violated the Fourth Amendment 
because the police misrepresented their identities to get the 
defendant to open his door. 103 According to the majority, 
Johnson implied that police could arrest a suspect without a 
warrant if he voluntarily opened the door in response to a 
noncoercive knock. 104 The majority then noted the consistency 
with its previous decision in United States v. Whitten,105 that 
a warrantless arrest of a suspect standing in the doorway of 
his motel room in response to a police knock did not violate 
Payton because a doorway, unlike the interior of a hotel room, 
is a public place. 106 
Since the police used no force, threats, or any type of sub-
terfuge to compel Vaneaton to open his door, the court found 
98. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. The majority noted that knocking on a door is 
hardly a mark of a police state. [d. 
99. [d. at 1426-27. 
100. [d. at 1426. 
101. [d. 
102. 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980). 
103. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426. 
104. [d. 
105. 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983). 
106. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 
(1976) (The Fourth Amendment is not violated by a warrantless felony arrest in a 
public place.). 
12
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that he voluntarily exposed himself in a public place. l07 The 
majority pointed out the district court's finding that Vaneaton 
opened the door voluntarily without police coercion. lOS The 
majority noted that the trial court's findings should not be 
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. 109 Since 
Vaneaton voluntarily exposed himself in a public place, the 
majority held that his warrantless arrest did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 110 
B. DISSENT: ANSWERING THE DOOR SHOULD NOT EXPOSE ONE 
TO A WARRANTLESS ARREST 
Judge Tashima, dissenting from the majority, asserted 
that arresting a citizen inside his or her home without a war-
rant, merely because he opened his door in response to a knock 
by police, is flatly contrary to Payton v. New York. lll To make 
a warrantless arrest inside one's dwelling, the dissent main-
tained that Payton requires a showing of exigent circumstances 
or of defendant's consent to the entry.ll2 The dissenting judge 
noted that the government failed to make a showing of ei-
ther.113 He suggested that Vaneaton, after seeing the uni-
formed officers out of his window, merely submitted to the 
implied authority of the police and did not consent to their 
entry into his motel room. 114 
107. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. (citing United States v. Al-Azzawy 784 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986». 
110. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. 
111. [d. at 1427 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
112. [d. at 1428. In a footnote, the dissent cited Johnson, 626 F.2d at 757, for 
the proposition that it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting 
officer, that determines whether an arrest occurs within the home. See Vaneaton, 
49 F.3d at 1428 n.3. Therefore, the dissent concluded that it is unquestioned that 
Vaneaton was arrested within his dwelling under Ninth Circuit law. [d. 
113. [d. at 1428. The government also argued that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the warrantless arrest. [d. at 1428 n.2. However, nothing prevented the police 
from obtaining a telegraphic warrant since four officers prevented Vaneaton from 
escaping. [d. Furthermore, police did not have a justifiable apprehension that evi-
dence might be destroyed as in a drug case. [d. 
114. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428. See United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 
(9th Cir. 1990) (Mere submission to the implied authority of uniformed police 
officers at one's door does not imply consent.). 
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The dissent characterized the majority opinion as adding a 
new "voluntary exposure" exception to Payton. us However, 
Judge Tashima asserted that neither Ninth Circuit nor Su-
preme Court case law supports a "voluntary exposure" excep-
tion. u6 His opinion noted that a recent Supreme Court case, 
New York v. Harris,117 was factually very similar to 
Vaneaton. us In Harris, the Court accepted the trial court's 
finding that Harris did not consent to the entry and held the 
warrantless arrest to have violated the rule of Payton. U9 
Judge Tashima contended that the majority's use of case 
law was misguided.120 He pointed out that, independent and 
unrelated to police conduct, the defendant in Santana stood on 
the threshold when police approached her.121 In a footnote, 
the dissent also pointed out that exigent circumstances justi-
fied the actual entry into Santana's home. 122 Judge Tashima 
then attacked the majority's use of Johnson, in which the po-
lice misidentified themselves to coerce the arrestee to open his 
door.123 His opinion noted that Johnson did not hold that the 
warrantless arrest would have been legal if they had not mis-
identified themselves. 124 Although the Whitten court, relying 
on Santana, found the suspect to be in a public place while 
standing in the doorway, the dissent urged that the warrant-
less arrest would have violated the Fourth Amendment if the 
defendant clearly stood inside the room. 12S He further argued 
that United States v. Al_Azzawy126 made clear that one may 
voluntarily expose oneself to arrest only by stepping outside of 
115. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428. 
116. [d. 
117. 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (Police knocked on the door with their guns and badges 
displayed and arrested the defendant after he let them enter.). 
118. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428. 
119. [d. at 1428-29. 
120. See id. at 1429. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 1429 n.5. 
123. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1429. 
124. See id. 
125. [d. 
126. 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985). In AI-Azzawy, police drew their weapons 
used a bullhorn to order the defendant to come out of his trailer. Vaneaton, 49 
F.3d at 1429. The court held that the defendant did not voluntarily expose himself 
outside his trailer but emerged only under circumstances of extreme coercion. [d. 
14
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one's home, not by remaining within it.127 The dissent urged 
that the Ninth Circuit cases do not represent the proposition 
that a citizen exposes himself to a warrantless arrest anytime 
he answers a door to the police.128 Therefore, the dissent con-
cluded that the majority's position is inconsistent with 
Payton. 129 
Judge Tashima asserted that the majority's opinion not 
only erodes the privacy interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, but is also bad policy. 130 His opinion warned 
that routine police investigation would be more difficult be-
cause the majority's decision discourages citizens from answer-
ing their doors when police knock. 131 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Vaneaton majority decided that police do not need a 
warrant to make a doorway arrest as long as they do not use 
coercion or subterfuge to compel the suspect to open his 
door. 132 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has ignored the firm 
line drawn by Payton v. New York. 133 Instead, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has adopted a rule that effectively protects only those who 
refuse to answer their doors when the police knock. 1M Since 
police did not need to obtain consent or have exigent circum-
stances to enter Vaneaton's motel room, the dissent correctly 
characterized the majority's opinion as creating a third excep-
tion to Payton's warrant requirement. 135 The Ninth Circuit 
now permits police to cross a threshold without a warrant to 
127. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1429. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 1430. Alternatively, the dissent argued that Vaneaton's behavior was 
not voluntary. [d. at 1430 n.B. The dissent pointed out that "coercion is implicit in 
situations where consent is obtained under color of the badge." [d. (citing Shaibu, 
920 F.2d at 1427). 
130. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1430. 
131. [d. 
132. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra 
notes 96-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's analysis. 
133. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1429 (Tashima, J., dissenting). Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
134. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1430 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
135. [d. at 1428 (Tashima, J. dissenting). See supra notes 111-31 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the dissent's opinion. 
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the extent necessary to effectuate an arrest as long as the 
suspect voluntarily exposes himself to arrest by freely choosing 
to answer his or her door.l3G 
Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have relied on United 
States v. Santana l37 to uphold warrantless arrests in door-
ways.l3B However, three factual differences distinguish 
Santana from Vaneaton. First, the Supreme Court expressly 
noted that the defendant in Santana stood directly in the door-
way, not inside of it. l39 She exposed herself to public view, 
speech, hearing, and touch as though she had been standing 
completely outside her house. l4O Conversely, Vaneaton stood 
directly inside the identifiable threshold of his doorway.l4l 
Second, Santana stood in her doorway as police ap-
proached, not as a result of a summons by police.142 The 
Vaneaton majority cursorily stated that the zone of privacy 
sought to be protected in Payton was not implicated in this 
case. l43 However, there seems to be a significant difference in 
the level of privacy an individual expects when answering his 
or her door but remaining inside the threshold as opposed to 
standing in an open doorway as police approach.l44 The Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Vaneaton assumes an individual forfeits 
his Fourth Amendment privacy interest by answering his 
door. 145 However, individuals should be allowed to answer 
136. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423. 
137. 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (a defendant had no expectation of privacy while stand-
ing directly in her doorway). See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Santana. 
138. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.l(e) at 589 (2d ed. 1987) 
(Some of the post-Payton lower court cases have upheld warrantless doorway ar-
rests by relying on Santana and describing the location of the arrestee as in the 
doorway.); see, e.g., United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(citing Santana for the proposition that a doorway, unlike the interior of a hotel 
room, is a public place). 
139. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40 n.1. 
140. [d. at 42. 
141. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1425. 
142. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40. 
143. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. 
144. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.3d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991). The 
Berkowitz court found that a person does not forfeit his privacy interest in his 
home by merely answering the door in response to a knock. [d. "We think society 
would recognize a person's right to choose to close his door on and exclude people 
he does not want within his home." [d. 
145. Accord United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (The 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/10
1996] WARRANTLESS ARRESTS 151 
their doors without exposing themselves to a warrantless ar-
rest. 146 
Finally, Santana does not clearly stand for the proposition 
that police are justified in making a warrantless entry to ar-
rest anytime a suspect stands at a doorway.147 In Santana, 
exigent circumstances justified the actual entry into the 
defendant's home. l46 In Vaneaton, the majority did not con-
tend that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry 
into the motel room to effectuate the arrest. 149 
Absent exigent circumstances or consent, Payton requires 
police to obtain a warrant before crossing the threshold of a 
home to make an arrest.150 The dissent correctly pointed out 
that Vaneaton never gave his consent to the entry by po-
lice. 151 In United States u. Shaibu, the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that individuals do not expect others to come into their 
homes, even though the door is open, without first requesting 
permission to enter. 152 The court found that a defendant's 
submission to an officer thrusting himself into an apartment 
did not constitute effective consent. 153 
Without a showing of exigent circumstances or consent, 
Vaneaton allows police to enter a dwelling to the extent neces-
sary to effectuate an arrest so long as the suspect "voluntarily 
defendant had "no protectable expectation of privacy at the open door to his hotel 
room."). 
146. State v. Holeman, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985). 
147. See Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
148. See id. at 42-43. Santana involved "hot pursuit". [d. at 42-43. Police had a 
realistic expectation that any delay would result in the destruction of evidence. [d. 
at 43. 
149. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1428 n.2 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
150. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. 
151. See id. at 1428 (Tashima, J., dissenting). See also United States v. 
Edmonson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). After agents ordered the suspect to 
open his door, the suspect opened it, turned around, and placed his hands on his 
head. [d. at 1514. The court held that this did not amount to implied consent to 
be arrested inside his residence since it was prompted by a show of official au-
thority. [d. at 1515. 
152. United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing 
that we do not expect others to walk into our homes without consent even if the 
door is open, and that an open door does not give police legal grounds to enter 
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exposes" himself by opening his door. l54 In so holding, the 
Ninth Circuit has ignored Payton's clear rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Vaneaton allowed 
police to make a warrantless arrest of a suspect who opened 
his door in response to a knock but remained inside the 
threshold. 155 The court refused to accept the argument that 
the Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York required a 
warrant, even when the police had to cross the identifiable 
threshold to complete the arrest.156 With this decision, the 
Ninth Circuit allows police to make a warrantless arrest inside 
a suspect's dwelling so long as the suspect opens his door vol-
untarily and the police notify him of his arrest from outside 
the threshold. 157 
Bryan Murray· 
154. See Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1423. 
155. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995). 
156. Id. at 1426. 
157. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423. 
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